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Late Conversion: The Impact of Professionalism on European Rugby Union. 
 
Abstract: Rugby union only went professional in 1995, much later than other major 
team sports resulting in major changes in league structures. Different arrangements 
regarding revenue sharing and salary caps between the three main European rugby 
leagues provides an opportunity to test the  impact of such  factors on competitive 
balance. The paper also considers the issue of competitive balance between leagues 
based on performances in European competitions. It has been argued that soccer’s 
rules  which  require  leagues  to  operate  along  national  lines  increased  competitive 
imbalance  at  both  national  and  European  level.  Rugby  provides  an  interesting 
comparison as it has no such restrictions. 
 
Key Words: Professional team sports, competitive balance, league structures, Coase 
Theorem, collective selling, broadcast rights, salary caps.  
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1: Introduction.  
There is an extensive literature on the economics of professional sports leagues, much 
of which emphasises the importance of competitive balance and uncertainty as key 
elements  in  the  attractiveness  of  sport.  This  literature  has  mainly  focused  on  US 
professional team sports, although soccer, which is by far the biggest professional 
team  sport  in  Europe,  has  also  featured  prominently.  Rugby  Union  provides  an 
interesting case study because, unlike soccer and the major US team sports, it only 
turned professional in 1995.
2 The move to professionalism in rugby resulted in very 
significant structural changes, at both club and league level. Thus rugby may provide 
some  new  insights  into  how differences  in  league  structures and  rules  relating to 
salary  caps  and  revenue  sharing  affect  competitive  balance.  The  present  paper 
describes the changes that have occurred since the introduction of professionalism and 
looks  at  the  evidence  on  competitive  balance  in  the  three  main  European  rugby 
leagues. Several  authors  have  argued that soccer’s rules  which require leagues  to 
operate along national lines have increased competitive imbalance in national leagues 
and in European wide competitions such as the Champions League. (Szymanksi, 2007 
and Vrooman, 2007). Rugby offers an interesting comparison in this regard as there is 
no requirement that leagues operate along national lines. 
 
The balance of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the economics 
literature  on  professional  sports  leagues.  The  historical  development  of  rugby  is 
described briefly in Section 3. Section 4 describes the structural changes that have 
taken  place  in  the  major  European  rugby  playing  countries  since  the  move  to 
professionalism. Evidence on competitive balance within the three main European 
rugby leagues is presented in Section 5. Section 6 considers the evidence on inter-
league competition. Some conclusions are outlined in Section 7. 
    
2: Economics of Professional Sports Leagues. 
Two organisational models are commonly observed  in professional sports  leagues 
throughout the world. Outside of the US soccer leagues operate a hierarchical multi-
division league structure with a system of promotion and relegation between divisions 
                                                
2 Rugby split into amateur and professional codes in 1895 (see below). The amateur code, known as 
Rugby Union remained the more widely played version of the sport. The professional variant is known 
as Rugby League. Over time rule changes have led to significant differences between the two sports. 
Throughout the paper rugby is used to refer to Rugby Union. 5 
 
whereby the bottom placed teams in a division at the end of the season are replaced by 
the top placed teams in the next highest division. In the US, the National Baseball 
League established a system of independent franchises which were each granted local 
monopolies. This business model was subsequently adopted by all major US sports 
leagues. Promotion and relegation is therefore not a feature of US sports leagues and 
league membership remains unchanged from one season to the next, although team 
franchises may be moved from one city to another.
3 
  
The economic literature recognises that sports leagues require a greater degree of 
cooperation between rival firms than most other industries. No team can produce a 
single  unit  of  output,  i.e.  one  match,  on  its  own.  (Goldfein,  1999).  Teams  are 
competitors in a sporting sense, in that the very essence of sport involves the teams in 
a particular game trying to beat one another, and each team in the league trying to 
finish higher than its rivals. Only by acting collectively, however, can a league and its 
member  clubs  produce  a  full  season  of  matches  resulting  in  a  championship 
competition.  The  US  Supreme  Court has described  league  sports as  “perhaps the 
leading example” of a business activity that “can only be carried out jointly.”
4 In other 
industries firms seek to take business from their rivals and would gain if their rivals 
were forced out of business. This is not true of sports leagues, since a team that put its 
rivals out of business by taking customers from them would have no teams left to play 
against. 
 
It has been suggested that the common interest of teams in sports leagues extends 
beyond the need to cooperate in order to produce a league championship competition. 
According to this view uncertainty of outcome is an essential feature of sport and this 
requires a degree of equality between the teams in a league. Consequently, it is argued 
that  measures  to  ensure  an  even  distribution  of  revenue  among  league  members 
provides teams with equal opportunities to hire the best players thereby improving 
                                                
3 Ross and Szymanski (2005) argue that the US model of a vertically integrated league run by its 
member clubs leads to inefficient outcomes in the absence of rival leagues and argue that a league 
which is separate from its member clubs has greater incentives to operate efficiently.  
4 National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85, 
101 (1984). Ross and Szymanski (2005), point out that the Australian courts have taken a different 
view seeing the key function of leagues as being to provide “competing organizing services.” Despite 
the recognition that no team acting alone can produce a single game, the US courts have rejected the 
argument  that  sports  leagues  constitute  an  essential  facility.  See  Mid  South  Grizzlies  v.  National 
Football League 720 F.2d 772 (3
rd Circ. 1983), 467 US 1215 (1984). 6 
 
competitive  balance  and  making  matches  more attractive  to  fans.  (Sloane,  2006). 
McMillan (1997) argued that competitive balance was essential to maintain a healthy 
level of competition in New Zealand rugby. The competitive balance argument has 
been advanced to justify a variety of arrangements that are commonly found in sports 
leagues such as salary caps, restrictions on players moving between teams and the 
collective selling of broadcasting rights by sports leagues and their member clubs. 
(Rottenberg, 1956, Szymanski and Kesenne, 2004). Szymanski (2007) describes the 
issue of competitive balance in professional team sports as  a practical test of the 
Coase theorem. 
 
Rottenberg (1956) pointed out that the reserve clause in baseball, which restricted 
players freedom to move between teams, did not prevent the migration of the best 
players to bigger teams. It thus had no effect on competitive balance but artificially 
depressed player salaries and enabled teams to earn monopoly rents. Quirk and El 
Hodiri  (1974)  demonstrated  that  revenue  sharing  would  have  no  impact  on  the 
distribution of playing talent if revenue generating potential varied between profit 
maximising teams. Both these results are examples of the invariance principle. Noll 
(2007a) argues that the financial viability of sports leagues is undermined rather than 
enhanced by measures that improve competitive balance.   
 
Several authors have questioned the view that revenue sharing improves competitive 
balance. (See, for example, Downward and Dawson, 1995; Cave and Crandall, 2001: 
and Szymanski, 2003). Szymanski and Kesenne (2004) found that sharing of gate 
revenues reduced competitive balance and reduced the incentive to win. Noll (2007a) 
concluded that decentralised selling of broadcast rights would improve competitive 
balance, while Fort and Quirke (1995) found that sharing of local television revenues 
improved competitive balance. Fort and Quirk (2007), however, found that a unique 
rational expectations equilibrium existed for US sports leagues providing a formal 
justification for the competitive balance argument, although they noted that such an 
equilibrium was unlikely to exist for non-cooperative leagues. Vrooman (2007) points 
out that revenue sharing and salary caps will improve competitive balance, if team 
owners  are  win  maximisers,  which  appears  true  of  European  soccer.  Garcia  and 
Rodriguez  (2009)  concluded  that  the  conditions  necessary  for  revenue  sharing  to 
affect competitive balance were not present in the case of Spanish football. Lenten 7 
 
(2009a)  reports  that  rules  designed  to  improve  competitive  balance  in  Australian 
Rules Football have had to be revised from time to time as clubs tended to find ways 
of getting around them thus lessening their impact on competitive balance. Lenten 
(2009b) nevertheless concludes that the existing salary cap and draft arrangements 
introduced in 1995 had increased competitive balance.  
 
Sloane (2006) argues that although the competitive-balance/uncertainty argument has 
tended  to  dominate  the  analysis  of  team  sports,  little  attention  has  been  paid  to 
defining and accurately measuring it. The literature refers to three different concepts 
of uncertainty. 
•  Short-run  uncertainty  of  match  outcome,  i.e.  uncertainty  regarding  the 
outcome of an individual match which should increase supporter interest in 
individual matches;  
•  Medium term or seasonal uncertainty of outcome, i.e. uncertainty over which 
team will ultimately win the league, which should serve to maintain supporter 
interest in matches involving a wider range of teams over the course of the 
season;  
•  Long term uncertainty of outcome, i.e. a lack of domination by one or more 
clubs over a number of seasons, sometimes referred to as dynamic competitive 
balance. 
 
Baimbridge  et  al.  (1996)  warned  that  broadcast  arrangements  for  England’s  FA 
Premier  League  (FAPL)  would  reduce  competitive  balance  by  increasing  income 
inequality  between  clubs.  Arnaut  (2006)  claimed  that  competitive  balance  had 
declined  in  several  top-flight  European  football  leagues.  Massey  (2007)  found 
evidence of a decline in short-run competitive balance in the FAPL. Vrooman (2007) 
concluded that dynamic competitive balance in the FAPL had declined. 
 
Szymanski (2003) observes that the competitive balance argument is based on two 
assumptions that may be unique to US sports: 
1.  The supply of talent available to clubs is fixed; and.  
2.  The absence of promotion and relegation in US leagues makes competitive 
balance more important for maintaining supporter interest over time.  8 
 
 
In soccer the promotion/relegation system means that teams that are relegated suffer 
significant declines in revenue.
5 (Szymanksi and Valetti, 2003). In addition the top 
teams  in  national  European  soccer  leagues  qualify  to  play  in  Europe  wide 
competitions, the most important of which is the UEFA Champions League, and earn 
substantial  extra  revenue  from  participating  in  those  competitions.
6  There  are  no 
equivalent multi-national competitions in US sports. It is not in the interests of the top 
soccer clubs that every team should have a broadly equal chance of reaching the 
Champions League or of being relegated.
7 
 
Revenue sharing is thus more limited in European soccer than in US Sports. In the 
NFL all broadcast revenue is shared equally in contrast to the FAPL where only 50% 
is  distributed  equally.
8  In  the  NFL  revenue  sharing  is  not  limited  to  broadcast 
revenues so that two thirds of total revenue is shared compared with 22.5% in the case 
of the FAPL. (Vrooman, 2007). In England, France and Germany half of the league’s 
total revenues accrue to the top 5 teams, while in Italy and Spain, where teams sell 
broadcast rights individually, two thirds of league revenues accrue to the top 5 teams. 
(ibid.)  
 
The distribution of UEFA Champions League broadcast revenue is skewed in favour 
of clubs from larger countries increasing competitive imbalance in domestic leagues.
9 
(Vrooman, 2007).  
                                                
5  Teams  that  are  relegated  from  the  FAPL  receive  compensation  payments,  known  as  “parachute 
payments”, for up to three years to help cushion them against such losses. 
6 It is estimated, for example, that in 2005/6 English club Arsenal, which reached the final of the 
Champions League received around £25m in Champions League broadcast revenues compared with 
£27m from FAPL broadcast revenues. (Parkes, 2007) 
7 For a more detailed analysis of the economic implications of the promotion and relegation system and 
Champions League see Noll (2007b).  
8  The  remaining 50%  is  split 50/50  between  merit  payments,  determined  by  a  club’s  final  league 
position and facility fees, which are determined by the number of times a club’s matches are broadcast. 
(Sloane, 2006). The latter arrangement tends to favour higher placed clubs’ whose matches are likely to 
be broadcast more often. 
9  50%  of  Champions  League  broadcast  revenue  is  distributed  on  the  basis  of  teams’  on-field 
performances, while the other 50% is distributed according to the relative value of the broadcast market 
in a team’s home country. Thus, when Portuguese club Porto won the Champions League in the 2003/4 
season it received a total of £13m in broadcast revenue but only £1.3m (10%) was from the broadcast 
pool due to the fact that the Portuguese broadcast market is relatively small in European terms. (Parkes, 
2007). Szymanski (2007) reported that Porto got less revenue than several of the other participating 
teams despite winning the competition.  9 
 
“It would appear that the Champions League has created chronic imbalance both 
inside  and  outside  the  competition  itself  and  outside  in  the  domestic  league 
championships.” (Szymanski, 2007, p.369). 
Palomino and Sakovics (2004) argue that national leagues have no incentive to undo 
such effects because the league as a whole benefits from the good performances by its 
members  in  European  competitions,  e.g.  through  an  increase  in  the  number  of 
participants from the league. 
  
Historically player mobility in European soccer was limited by the transfer system 
which prevented players leaving the clubs that employed them, even if their contracts 
had expired, and by limits on the number of foreign players that a team could employ. 
The  European  Court  of  Justice  Judgment  in  the  Bosman  case
10  ruled  that  such 
arrangements were in breach of the EU Treaties. Thus European soccer now has a 
fully  mobile  labour  market  but  product  markets  remain  closed  as  soccer’s  rules 
require  leagues  to operate  along  national  lines.  This  has  increased  the  imbalance 
between the larger and smaller countries. 
 
Kesenne (2007) observed that top teams in countries such as Belgium and Holland, 
including  Ajax  a  team  which won  the  European  Cup on  several occasions  in the 
1970s,  can  no  longer  compete  with  big  clubs  from  larger  countries  for  the  best 
players. In order to have the same ratio of population to top division football teams as 
England, Belgium would have to reduce its league to just four or five clubs, which is 
too few for a viable league competition. Broadcast rights are higher in larger markets 
and Noll (2007a) argues that this explains the relative decline of Belgian teams in 
European terms. The best players have tended to move to the four or five richest 
leagues thus, lowering the quality of leagues in smaller countries and widening the 
gap  between teams  from  smaller  and  larger  countries. The  exodus of  top players 
reduced the supply of talent available in smaller countries thus bidding up wages for 
the remaining lower quality players and leading to the near bankruptcy of several 
                                                
10 Case C-415/93 Union Royale des Societes de football association, Royal Club Liegois et UEFA v. 
Jean Marc Bosman [1995] ECR I 4921. 10 
 
Belgian and Dutch top division clubs. (Kesenne, 2007). The Champions League has 
become increasingly dominated by teams from the four or five largest countries.
11  
 
The rules prevent teams from smaller countries joining leagues in larger countries and 
prevent mergers of smaller country leagues that would enable them to increase the 
ratio of population to top clubs, thereby potentially increasing revenue. Szymanski 
(2009) reported that the top Dutch and Belgian clubs had considered establishing a 
single league but were prevented from doing so by the existing rules. Vrooman (2007) 
reported that UEFA also blocked an attempt by clubs in seven smaller countries to 
establish a new league to compete with the big 5 leagues.
12 The two largest Scottish 
clubs, Rangers and Celtic, the latter another former European Cup winner, have been 
prevented from joining the FAPL. Mergers of smaller country leagues could increase 
competition between European leagues and improve competitive balance within the 
Champions League. (Kesenne, 2007). Cities like Amsterdam and Glasgow might well 
be capable of supporting top level European teams but are prevented from doing so 
under the present rules.  
 
3: Rugby – A Brief Overview. 
Rugby, like soccer emerged in England in the mid nineteenth century. Rules based on 
those of Rugby School, where tradition has it the game originated, were drawn up and 
the Rugby Football Union (RFU) was established at a meeting of clubs at the Pall 
Mall Restaurant in London in January 1871.
13 The World governing body for rugby is 
the  International  Rugby  Board  (IRB)  which  was  founded  in  1886  and  has  its 
headquarters in Dublin. Compared with soccer, rugby, at least at the highest level, is 
played in a relatively limited number of countries worldwide.
14 
 
                                                
11  This  imbalance  is  exacerbated  by the  bias  in  the  allocation  of  Champions  League  broadcasting 
revenues  in  favour  of  teams  from  the  larger  countries.  See  Palomino  and  Sakovics  (2004)  on 
competition between European football leagues for players. 
12 The proposed league was to be known as the Atlantic League and would have involved teams from 
Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Scotland’s Celtic and Rangers.  
13  This  brief  account  is  summarised  from  information  contained  on  the  RFU  website  at 
http://www.rfu.com/AboutTheRFU/History.aspx  
14 There are effectively six top level rugby playing countries in Europe (England, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Scotland and Wales) and four in the Southern Hemisphere (Argentina, Australia, South Africa and 
New Zealand). The IRB, however, includes a total of 95 rugby playing countries in its world rankings. 11 
 
Szymanski (2009) argues that the question of professionalism emerged in team sports 
once they began to attract large paying audiences. US baseball split into amateur and 
professional codes in 1871. In 1885, a similar crisis emerged in English soccer but a 
successful compromise was reached preventing a split, which essentially allowed for 
players to be paid while amateurs retained control of the sport’s governing body. Ten 
years later the issue raised its head in rugby when clubs in the North of England 
wanted to make payments to players, not for playing, but as compensation for wages 
lost as a result of playing matches on Saturdays.
15 As the RFU put it: 
“In  the  South  where  players  were  more  well-heeled  and  didn’t  work  at 
weekends this was irrelevant but a powerful group insisted that payment was 
against the true interests of the game and consequently  22 leading clubs from 




In 1995 the IRB amended its rules to permit professionalism. This resulted in major 
changes in the structure of the sport at both club and league level in all of the main 
rugby playing countries, although there were significant differences in the responses 
in different countries. 
 
4: Rugby in the Professional Era. 
In  contrast  to  soccer,  English  rugby  has  no  long  tradition  of  a  national  league 
championship competition for clubs. The Courage League only began in 1987/8 with 
12 clubs which played each other once over the course of the season although there 
were no set dates for fixtures. Fixed Saturday fixtures were introduced the following 
season and in 1993/4 the teams first played each other on a home and away basis.
17 
According  to  Richards  (1996)  the  move  to  professionalism  resulted  in  a  major 
upheaval  in  English  rugby  with  galloping  inflation  and  “a  desperately  uncertain 
future.” Bitter disputes erupted between the RFU and the leading clubs over the terms 
for  the  release  of  players  to  play  for  the  England  team  and  over  the  division  of 
television revenues. (McMillan, 1997) This led the leading clubs to establish a new 
                                                
15 Such payments became known as “broken time” payments. 
16 http://www.rfu.com/AboutTheRFU/History.aspx  
17 Source: http://www.premiershiprugby.com/information/history.php  12 
 
association to run the domestic league competition, known as the Premiership, which 
replaced the Courage League. 
 
There was also considerable restructuring and innovation at club level. Several clubs 
were acquired by wealthy individuals while others floated on the stock exchange. One 
company Newcastle United Ltd. operates both professional soccer and rugby teams. 
In another case a rugby union and rugby league team merged and operates teams in 
both codes. Some clubs adopted innovative approaches to player incentives with the 
London Wasps club offering share options to players linking their remuneration to the 
club’s future stock market price. (McMillan, 1997).  
 
The  Premiership  operates  a  revenue  sharing  and  a  salary  cap  arrangement.  All 
revenues,  including  those  received  by  teams  from  participation  in  European 
competitions  (see  below)  are  split  equally  between  the  member  teams.  Such 
arrangements  are  considered  necessary  to  ensure  the  long-term  viability  of  the 
league’s  member  clubs  rather  than  to  ensure  competitive  balance.
18  There  is 
promotion and relegation, although only the bottom team in the Premiership at the end 
of each season changes places with the top team in the next division.  
 
The transition to professionalism was somewhat less disruptive in France than in other 
countries, at least initially. The French national championship known as the Top 14 
traces its  origins back to 1892. Prior  to 2005/6  the  league  was  composed of two 
sections of eight teams with the top teams from each section reaching the play-offs. In 
2005/6  the  Top 14  was  restructured  into  a  single  division  of  14  teams.  There  is 
promotion and relegation with the bottom two teams each season changing places 
with the top two from the league immediately below the Top 14. Following the move 
to professionalism  a  number of clubs  were acquired by  wealthy  individuals  as  in 
England. French clubs do not operate a revenue sharing arrangement.  
 
                                                
18 The  League was reduced to its current 12 teams in 1999/2000 when one club, Richmond, went 
bankrupt and London Irish and London Scottish merged. Other clubs have also encountered financial 
difficulties.  Assuming  that  teams  play  each  other  twice  during  the  season,  a  reduction  in  league 
membership from 12 teams to 10, for example, would reduce the total number of matches from 132 to 
90, with potential implications for the viability of the league.  13 
 
In recent seasons a number of French clubs have experienced financial difficulties. 
Bourgoin only avoided a bankruptcy filing in 2009 as a result of its players agreeing 
to large wage cuts. The club was denied a professional licence by the league due to 
their  ongoing  financial  issues,  but  this  decision  was  reversed  on  appeal.
19  Brive, 
whose  2009/10  wage  bill  was  €7.2  million,  announced  that  they  would  cut  their 
budget by 40% for the following season, while a third club Montauban were relegated 
at the end of the 2009/10 season after filing for bankruptcy. These financial problems 
resulted in the introduction of a salary cap from the beginning of the 2010/1 season, 
albeit at a much higher level than in England. 
 
The Irish Rugby Football Union is an all Ireland body and the Ireland international 
team includes players from both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The 
IRFU has four provincial branches and historically clubs were organised into four 
provincial leagues. In addition there were four provincial representative teams that 
played against one another in an annual inter-provincial championship.
20 A national 
club  league,  known  as  the  AIL  with  approximately  50  teams  divided  into  a 
hierarchical four division structure, was only established in 1989/90.  
 
The rugby fan base in Ireland was insufficient to support a full time professional club 
league, while the four team Inter-Provincial Championship, was too small to operate 
as a viable professional league. Following the introduction of professionalism, the 
IRFU adopted a policy of centrally contracting all of its leading Irish based players. 
All contracted players play for one of the four provincial teams and the IRFU largely 
controls  which  provincial  team  an  individual  plays  for.
21  In  addition  the  four 
provincial teams are each allowed contract a number of non-Irish players.  
 
The IRFU is able to exert this level of control because the bulk of revenue in rugby 
was  traditionally  generated from international  matches.  Income  from  international 
                                                
19 http://sports.orange.fr/infos/rugby/201027/bourgoin-maintenu-en-top-14_281127.html  
20 The Championship was played on a league format with the teams playing against each other once, 
with home advantage alternating from year to year. 
21 The decision by the IRFU to centrally contract players appears to have been prompted by concerns 
that there would have been an exodus of top players to overseas leagues. One of the four professional 
teams, Connacht, effectively operates as a development or “farm” team receiving significantly lower 
levels of funding than the other three teams. Initially contracted players continued to play with their 
AIL club teams as the four provincial teams only played a limited number of matches each season. 14 
 
matches (both ticket sales and broadcast revenue) in 2009/10 accounted for around 
60% of total IRFU revenue. The IRFU pays the bulk of the running costs of the four 
provincial  teams  and  such  outlays  accounted  for  60%  of  its  total  expenditure  in 
2009/10. (IRFU, 2009/10)  The IRFU also funds the provincial teams’ development 
squads and under age international teams. Broadcast revenues and prize money from 
the Irish teams’ participation in the European Rugby Cup (ERC) is paid to the IRFU 
along with the bulk of teams’ gate receipts from home matches in the competition. 
Rugby in Ireland is thus vertically integrated with the relationship between the IRFU 
and the four professional teams effectively a parent subsidiary one.  
 
In Wales the transition to professionalism resulted in what the Welsh Rugby Union’s 
(WRU) Chief Executive described as “a painful few years for Welsh rugby as it has 
been forced to adapt and change in an attempt to climb out of the financial mire.” 
(WRU,  2003/4,  p.16).  In  2003/4  financial  pressures  led  to  a  restructuring  with 
mergers between a number of clubs leading to the establishment of five regionally 
based professional teams.
22 Payments to regional teams accounted for only 25% of 
total WRU expenditure in 2009/10.
23 Apart from such payments, there are no revenue 
sharing arrangements between the regional teams. The relationship between the WRU 
and the regions is governed by an agreement which runs up to May 2014. Thus Welsh 
rugby exhibits a high degree of vertical integration but not to the same extent as in 
Ireland  
 
Initially  Wales  retained  its  club  structure  and national  league, the  Welsh Premier 
League. In 1999 two Scottish teams (Edinburgh and Glasgow) joined to form the 
Welsh-Scottish League. In 2001/2 the Irish, Scottish and Welsh Rugby Unions came 
together  to  establish  a  new  league,  originally  known  as  the  Celtic  League  but 
subsequently  renamed  the  Magner’s  League.  The  league  is  run  by  Celtic  Rugby 
Limited.  
 
                                                
22 The number was reduced to four due to financial pressures after just one season. “Professional rugby 
has been condensed to four regions and I stand by something I said 18 months ago - four regions are as 
many as Welsh rugby can sustain, for both player resource and financial reasons.” (CEO’s Statement, 
WRU Annual Report 2003-2004, p.7). Below the regions a club league continues to operate on a semi-
professional basis. 
23 The WRU allocated £12m on its regional teams compared with €35m in the case of the IRFU. 15 
 
The size and format of the Magner’s League has varied over time. In its first season 
the league consisted of 15 teams (9 from Wales, 4 from Ireland and 2 from Scotland) 
divided into two sections with the top four from each section qualifying for the play-
off stages. A third Scottish team was added in the second season bringing the number 
of teams to 16 while the format remained unchanged. In 2003/4 the format changed to 
a  straightforward  league  competition  involving  12  teams  with  the  five  newly 
established Welsh regional teams replacing club teams. The league was reduced to 11 
teams the following season due to the withdrawal of one of the Welsh regional teams 
and was further reduced to 10 in 2007/8 with the withdrawal of one of the Scottish 
teams. A play-off to decide the  league winners involving the top four teams was 
introduced in 2009/10. The number of teams increased to 12 for the 2010/1 season 
with the admission of two Italian teams. 
  
The  Magner’s  League  provided  the  Irish  provincial  teams  with  a  season  long 
programme  of  matches  which  enabled  the  IRFU  to  effectively  re-brand  the  four 
provincial teams as professional franchises while traditional club sides continue to 
play in the AIL on an amateur/part-time professional basis.  
 
The ERC (also known as the Heineken Cup) was launched at the beginning of the 
1995/6 season, at the same time as the move to professionalism. In some respects the 
ERC might be seen as the rugby equivalent of soccer’s Champions League. Unlike the 
latter competition, which is run by UEFA the governing body of soccer in Europe, the 
ERC is run by European Rugby Cup, a company based in Dublin. Participation in the 
ERC is confined to teams from England, France, Ireland, Italy, Scotland and Wales, 
although  English and Scottish teams  did  not participate  in  the  first  season of the 
competition.
24  While  the  entrants  from  the  other  participating  countries  were 
originally club teams, the IRFU secured agreement to enter provincial representative 
teams in the competition. 15 teams took part in the ERC in its first season but this has 
since expanded to 24.  
 
                                                
24 English teams did not participate in 1998/9 either. Romania had one team in the ERC in its first year 
but has not participated since. The six participating countries each have two directors on the ERC 
board. A second European competition, the ECC (also known as the Amlin Cup) was also established 
involving teams ranked below those qualifying for the ERC. 16 
 
The ERC has not had the same distorting effect on competitive balance within leagues 
as the Champions League in soccer. Of the 38 teams that play in the top divisions of 
the three main European leagues, 24 qualify to play in the ERC with virtually all of 
the  Magner’s  League  teams  qualifying.
25  England  and  France  each  receive  six 
automatic places, but in the case of the English clubs the revenue from participation is 
shared among all of the league members. Since 2010/1 the previous year’s winners of 
the ERC and Amlin Cup also qualify.
26 
 
5: Competitive Balance in European Rugby Leagues. 
In both England and France wealthy individuals have acquired clubs and invested 
heavily  in  them  while  several  clubs  in  both  countries  have  got  into  financial 
difficulties suggesting that it is reasonable to regard clubs as win maximisers. The 
Irish, Scottish and Welsh Magner’s League teams are all reliant to varying degrees for 
revenue  from  their  parent  associations  for  revenue,  which  the  latter  derive  from 
international matches. This again suggests that the clubs are not profit maximisers and 
that the national associations play the part of wealthy benefactors.
27 
 
The English and French leagues are based on a hierarchical structure similar to soccer. 
The fact that only one team is relegated each season from the Premiership arguably 
means it has a quasi-fixed structure. Eight of the 12 teams have been members of the 
league for all of its 14 seasons while two others have participated for 13 seasons out 
of 14. The Premiership operates a salary cap and revenue sharing arrangement while 
the Top 14 traditionally did not, only introducing a salary cap (at a much higher level) 
in 2010/1. A priori, the Premiership should display a greater degree of competitive 
balance than the Top 14.  
 
                                                
25 At least ten of the twelve Magner’s League teams qualify to play in the ERC. Italy and Scotland 
receive two ERC places which go to their two Magner’s League teams. Ireland and Wales are each 
allocated three automatic ERC places. In effect the Irish and Welsh teams compete in “mini national 
leagues” within the overall league to decide ERC qualification. 
26 The number of English and French participants is capped at seven, so that if teams from one of these 
countries win both the ERC and ECC, the final ERC place is allocated to the highest non-qualifying 
ERC ranked team.   
27 The Scottish Rugby Union’s Strategic Plan provides, for example, that both Scottish professional 
teams should increase their win ratio in the Magner’s League to 55%, finish in the top 5 and achieve 
one quarter final appearance in the ERC by 2012. SRU (2007). 17 
 
The Magner’s League is akin to US sports leagues with no system of promotion or 
relegation so that membership is largely fixed. There would appear to be little room 
for the league to expand beyond the current 12 teams following the addition of two 
Italian teams. The league is, however, composed of teams from different countries, 
which operate different national arrangements in relation to revenue sharing.
28  
 
We now consider the evidence on competitive balance for the various rugby leagues. 
Fourie and Siebrits (2008) used a number of different measures and concluded that 
the three European rugby  leagues displayed a high degree of competitive balance 
although their study only covered three seasons. 
 
First  we  consider  short-term  uncertainty  or  uncertainty  of  outcome  of  individual 
matches. We measure competitive balance by calculating the standard deviation of 
points obtained by each of the participating teams in each league in each season. We 
calculate points scored using the rules for each league for each season but ignoring 
bonus points.
29 As a basis of comparison we also calculate the competitive balance in 
soccer’s FAPL.  
 
Figure 1 below shows how the degree of competitive balance has changed over time 
in the various leagues. The solid line in each diagram gives the least squares line. 
 
The chart shows that competitive imbalance has increased in the FAPL over time, 
which is consistent with previous studies. (See, for example, Massey, 2007). It is also 
interesting  to  note  that  the  courage  league  in  England  showed  an  increase  in 
competitive imbalance during its existence. In contrast competitive balance increased 






                                                
28 The league gave the two Italian teams that joined in 2010/1 a minimum revenue guarantee for their 
first three seasons. 
29 The three European rugby leagues award teams bonus points for scoring a certain number of tries in 






The results are summarised in Table 1 which shows the coefficient of the regression 
of competitive balance on time in each sub sample. As a basis of comparison we see 
that the competitive balance in the FAPL has decreased overtime (i.e. the standard 
deviation of points has increased over time). The estimated coefficient is statistically 
significant  even though  we  have  only  14  annual observations.  In  the  case of the 
Rugby competitions, we see that competitive balance has increased overtime in the 
English  Premier  League  and  in  France’s  Top  14,  although  the  coefficient  is 
statistically insignificant by normal standards. In the case of the Magner’s league, 
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Table 1: Competitive Balance using Standard Deviation of Points 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |  FAPL    Premiership  Courage  Magners  Top 14 
            League    League      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
year   |  0.272*   -0.293   0.311    -1.474**  -0.254      
cons   |  -531.351*  604.512  -594.144  2973.772**      527.395      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N   |  14.000   14.000   10.000   9.000    6.000      
r
2   |  0.311    0.182    0.142    0.708    0.062      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
A commonly used measure of short-run competitive balance is the adjusted standard 
deviation of win ratios. The adjusted standard deviation is calculated as the ratio of 
the  actual  standard  deviation  to  an  idealised  win  ratio  generated  by  a  perfectly 
balanced league. The latter is defined as 0.5/√n (where n is the number of games 
played). This measure is attributed to Noll (1988) and Scully (1989). Humphreys 
(2002) argues that this measure is better than other measures of competitive balance. 
Lenten (2009a) points out, however, that the ratio is highly sensitive to occasional 
outliers. The adjusted standard deviation results were regressed over time to see if 
competitive balance in the various leagues had improved over time. The results are 
shown in Table 2.  
 
The results mirror those of Table 1. The time coefficient is negative for the English, 
French and Magner's leagues but is insignificant in all three. Interestingly, the time 
coefficient is positive and significant for the Courage league which indicates that the 






                                                
30 It should be noted that the final two seasons of the Courage League fall within the professional era. 20 
 
Table 2: Competitive Balance using Adjusted Standard Deviation of Win Ratios 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |  FAPL    Premiership  Courage  Magners  Top 14 
               |          League   League 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
year      |  0.030    -0.017   0.073**  -0.005   -0.089      
cons      |  -58.604  36.493   -143.843**       10.819  178.796      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N      |  14.000   14.000   10.000   8.000    6.000      
 r
2      |  0.272    0.061    0.695    0.004    0.377      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
A commonly observed feature of sports leagues is the fact that home teams are more 
likely win. Figure 2 shows the proportion of home wins per season  for the three 
European rugby leagues.  
   






















Premiership Magner's League Top 14
 
Source: http://www.premiershiprugby.com/ , http://www.lnr.fr/ and http://www.rabodirectpro12.com/   
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The proportion of home wins in the Top 14 was generally higher than in the other 
three competitions and exceeded 70% in every season apart from 2008/9. In the case 
of the other three competitions approximately two thirds of matches resulted in home 
wins, although there have been several seasons when the ratio of home wins in the 
Premiership, in particular, was significantly lower.
31 
 
In addition to gaining league points for winning or drawing matches, teams in all 
three  leagues  earn  a  bonus point  if they  lose a  game  by seven points  or  less.  A 
difference of seven points or less means that in theory the teams were divided by a 
single score at the end of the match suggesting that the outcome was uncertain up to 
the final whistle.
32 The number of “close” matches defined as matches in which there 
was just a single score between the teams (including drawn matches) thus provides an 
alternative indication of the relative closeness of matches and of competitive balance 
in the various leagues. The results for each of the three European rugby leagues are 
illustrated in Figure 3.  
 















Premiership Magners League Top 14
 
Source: As Fig. 2. 
 
The chart shows that a h-igh proportion of Premiership matches were close contests, 
over 50% in a number of seasons. For the period since 2004/5 around 40-45% of 
                                                
31  Over  the  period  1997/8-2010/1  64%  of  Premiership  matches  have  resulted  in  home  wins.  The 
average  for the Magner’s  League for the  period since 2003/4 was 67%. Draws (tied)  matches are 
relatively  unusual  in  rugby.  Less  than  4%  of  Premiership  matches  resulted  in  draws  while  the 
corresponding figures for the Magner’s League and Top 14 were 2.7% and 4.4% respectively. 
32 A converted try in rugby is worth seven points.  22 
 
Magner’s League matches have resulted in close finishes and the results for the Top 
14 were broadly similar. Thus on this measure the Premiership displays a slightly 
greater  degree  of  competitive  balance  than  the  Top  14  which  is  in  line  with 
expectations. 
 
Next we consider the issue of dynamic competitive balance, i.e. whether the various 
leagues are dominated  by  a  small  number of  teams or  whether  the  championship 
rotates  between  several  different  clubs.  Table  3  gives  details  of  the  number  and 
frequency of championship wins in the three leagues since 1997/8 (2001/2 in the case 
of the Magner’s League). 
 
Table 3: League Champions 




Seasons  14  14  10  10 
No.  Of 
winners 
6  5  5  3 
















Munster (Irl) 3 
Leinster (Irl) 2 
Llanelli (Wal) 
1 






HHI  0.29  0.33  024  0.44 
Source: As Fig. 2.  
 
Since its establishment in 1997/8, six teams have won the Premiership, while there 
have been only five winners of the Top 14 over the same period. Stade Francais
33 won 
the  Top  14  on  seven  occasions  while  Leicester  has  won  the  Premiership  on  six 
occasions over this period. There have been five winners of the Magner’s League over 
                                                
33 Although  a long  established club, prior to the  move to  professionalism, Stade had largely  been 
confined to the lower levels of French rugby and their re-emergence as a top force followed the clubs 
acquisition by a wealthy businessman following the move to professionalism. 23 
 
a shorter space of team, three Irish and two Welsh. The first Welsh success came after 
the restructuring of club teams into regional teams, while no Scottish team has won 
the title to date. No team has won the Magner’s League in successive seasons. 
 
The HHI is widely used to measure market concentration in the industrial organisation 
literature and can be used to measure dynamic competitive balance in sports leagues. 
(See, for example, Leeds and von Allmen, 2005). In this case a team’s “market share” 
can be defined as its proportionate number of championship wins, i.e. in the case of 
Leicester in the Premiership this is equal to 6/14. Teams “market shares” are then 
squared and summed to arrive at the HHI for each league. The maximum value of the 
HHI in each case is 1 which would arise where a single team “monopolised” the 
league by winning it every season while the minimum value is 1/n where n is the 
number of seasons. 
 
The HHI data in Table 3 suggest that the Magner’s League displayed the greatest 
degree  of  dynamic  competitive  balance.  The  Premiership  had  a  higher  degree  of 
dynamic competitive balance than the French Top 14 which is consistent with revenue 
sharing  and  salary  caps  resulting  in  greater  competitive  balance.  It  is  also  worth 
noting that the Premiership displays a much greater degree of competitive balance 
than its predecessor the Courage League.
34 
 
We also tested the degree of dynamic competitive balance using a test proposed by 
Vrooman (2007). The test measures team performance on the basis of points obtained 
over  the  course  of  a  season  as  a  percentage  of  the  maximum  possible  points 
obtainable.  The  test assumes  that the points  obtained  by a  team  would  follow  an 
autoregressive process over playing seasons. If the auto regression has close to a unit 
root then the league would be largely deterministic i.e. the league structures acted to 
keep the imbalance between teams constant with any change being the result of a 
random shock. The results for the various rugby leagues and the FAPL are shown in 
Table 4.  
 
 
                                                
34 The HHI for the FAPL for the period from 1997/8 to 2010/1 was 0.42. 24 
 
Table 4: Vrooman Regression Results 
(Points) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Variable |  FAPL      Premiership   Courage  Magners  Top 14      
                League   League 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
L.pts      |  0.879***       0.482***        0.738***  0.392***  0.592***   
_cons     |  0.046*          0.264***  0.126*   0.296***  0.216**    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N         |  218.000        140.000           89.000   86.000   55.000      
r
2          |  0.635           0.193    0.394    0.158    0.314      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
The autoregressive coefficient is significant in every regression. The coefficient was 
extremely high in the case of the FAPL indicating that the league outcome is largely 
deterministic which is consistent with Vrooman (2007). In contrast the coefficients 
were much lower and appear to be systematically lower in each of the three European 
rugby  leagues.  The  Premiership  and  Magner’s  League  coefficients,  in  particular, 
suggest a high degree of dynamic competitive balance. The coefficient was lowest in 
the  case  of  the Magner’s League  which is  consistent  with  the  results  in Table  3. 
Similarly  the  Premiership  coefficient  is  lower  than  that  for  the  Top  14  which  is 
consistent  with  revenue  sharing  and  salary  caps  improving  dynamic  competitive 
balance.    
 
The results also allow us to compare the degree of dynamic competitive balance in 
rugby before and after the switch to professionalism in the  case of England. The 
coefficient was much lower for the Premiership than for the Courage League and the 
drop  in  the  component  is  statistically  significant.  The  evidence  here  is  therefore 
consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  the  introduction  of  professionalism  led  to  an 
improvement in dynamic competitive balance.   
 
Performing the Vrooman regression using win ratios yields a similar result for the 
various rugby leagues as Table 5 illustrates. 25 
 
 
Table 5: Vrooman Regression Results 
(Win Ratio) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    Variable |  Premiership  Courage  Magners    Top 14  
          League   League   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
L.wins        |  0..488***  0.676***  0.382***    0.577***   
 _cons         |   0.250***  0.155**  0.295***    0.214**    
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                |  140.000  89.000   86.000     55.000      
r
2                |  0.196    0.341    0.150      0.311      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                   
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
6: Inter-League Competitive Balance. 
As in soccer there is a European labour market and thus competition between leagues 
for players.
35 In contrast to soccer, however, there is  no requirement that  leagues 
operate  along  national  lines.  Consequently  the  three  smaller  countries  (Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales) have established a joint league to compete with the national 
leagues in England and France. 
“The Celtic League is vitally important for rugby in this country. We have to take 
it seriously and we have to encourage Ireland to take it seriously. If the Celtic 
League is to go head-to-head with the Zurich Premiership, the Irish Rugby Football 
Union - in particular - have to get on board.” (Statement of WRU Chief Executive, 
WRU, 2003/4. p.7)  
 
It is estimated that the top French clubs operated on a budget of around £16m for the 
2009/10 season, while top English side Northampton had an estimated turnover of 
£12m at that time. The average player’s salary in the English Premiership in 2009/10 
was roughly stg£80,000 a year, compared with just over stg£100,000 in the French 
                                                
35 In 2009/10 close to 30 English players were employed by French Top 14 clubs, roughly double the 
figure for 2007/8. (Owen, 2010). It is estimated that New Zealand and South Africa each have around 
600 players playing abroad in professional  or semi-professional leagues, many  of them in Europe. 
(Thornley, 2010). 26 
 
Top 14. (Owen, 2010). The IRFU spent €35 million on its four professional teams in 
2009/10. (IRFU, 2009/10).  
 
The ERC enables some direct comparisons to be made between the different leagues. 
In 16 seasons there have been six English, five French and five Magner’s League 
winners of the ERC with all five Magner’s League wins due to Irish teams. English 
teams did not participate in the competition for two seasons. Thus the English record 
is six wins out of 13 seasons while the French is five wins from 15 seasons, including 
one when there were no English participants.
36 The number of Irish wins is notable 
given that it has fewer participating teams than the two larger countries and the more 
limited financial resources of the Irish teams. The Irish wins have prevented teams 
from the two larger countries dominating the competition. To date there have been no 
Scottish, Welsh or Italian winners of the ERC. 
 




Table 6: Number of ERC Quarter-Final Appearances. 
  Top 14  Premiership  Magner’s League 
1996/7-2010/1  44  35  41 
excl. 1997/8  40  35  37 
Source: http://www.ercrugby.com/eng/13_70.php   
 
Top 14 teams have made 44 appearances in the quarter-finals while Magner’s League 
teams  made  41  and  Premiership  teams  35.
38  Excluding  the  1997/8  season  when 
Premiership teams did not participate, there was little overall difference in the number 
of  quarter  final  appearances  by  teams  from  each  of the  leagues  with  the  Top 14 
edging  it  slightly  with  40 as  against  37 for the Magner’s  League and  35 for the 
Premiership. 
                                                
36 Irish team Ulster won the ERC in the other season when English teams did not take part. 
37 There were no quarter finals in the first season of the competition in 1995/6 with only four teams 
qualifying from the group stages. 
38  In  terms  of  the  41  quarter-final appearances  by  Magner’s  League teams  Irish  teams  have  fared 
slightly better than their Welsh counterparts (22 v 18) while a Scottish team has only made the quarter-
finals once. Interestingly prior to 2002/3 when the Welsh club teams merged to form four regional 
teams,  Welsh  teams  recorded  ten  quarter  final  appearances  in  six  seasons  compared  with  eight 
appearances in nine seasons since.  27 
 
 
Table 7 looks at the overall win ratio in ERC pool matches by league. The table 
shows that overall Premiership teams have a marginally better win record than Top 14 
teams. Magner’s League teams have a significantly lower win ratio although the table 
also shows a considerable variation between countries in this case with Irish teams 
having the best overall record in the competition having won 60% of matches played 
(163  wins  from 270  matches),  while  Scottish  teams have won  only  30% of their 
matches.
39 Welsh teams have won 45% of their ERC pool matches. Interestingly the 
merger of club teams into four regional teams has had virtually no impact on the win 
ratio for Welsh teams.
40 Italian teams have by far the poorest record winning just over 
12% of their ERC pool matches. 
 
Table 7: ERC Pool Matches % Wins By League 1995/6-2010/1 
Premiership  58.0 
Top 14  57.2 
Magner’s League  46.6 
of which   
Ireland  60.4 
Wales  45.0 
Scotland  30.1 
Italy  12.4 
Note The Magner’s League figure does not include Italian teams as they only joined the 
league in 2010/1. 
Source: http://www.ercrugby.com/eng/13_70.php   
 
The lack of revenue sharing and salary cap arrangements in the Top 14 would suggest 
that French teams should outperform English teams in the ERC. Despite this English 
teams have won the ERC more often than French teams, while Irish teams have the 
same number of wins as French teams despite operating off much lower budgets. 
English teams also have a marginally better overall win record in the group stages 
than Top 14 teams but the latter have a slightly better record in terms of reaching the 
                                                
39 In general teams from different countries are kept apart in the group stages although there is some 
overlap. Nevertheless the country win ratios provide a good indication of the record of teams from each 
country against those from other countries.  
40 Pre 2002/3 the Welsh club teams won 44.6% of their ERC pool matches while the regional teams 
have won 45.3% of their ERC pool matches. 28 
 




Rugby became professional far more recently than most other major team sports. The 
move to professionalism has resulted in a significant restructuring of the sport. This 
has  effectively  involved  the  creation  of  new  professional  franchises  in  Ireland, 
Scotland and Wales and the establishment of a new multi-national league for those 
franchises. In England  and France,  professionalism  has brought  major  changes  in 
structure, particularly with regard to team ownership, while in the former country the 
concept  of  an  organised  league  really  only  emerged  following  the  move  to 
professionalism. The move to professionalism also resulted in the establishment of a 
new European competition, the ERC, similar to soccer’s Champion’s League. 
 
The different structures and different arrangements between the various rugby leagues 
with regard to revenue sharing and salary caps provides an interesting test of how 
such rules affect competitive balance. Our results indicate that dynamic competitive 
balance, i.e. uncertainty of  league outcome  from season to season  is  significantly 
greater for the three European rugby leagues than for the FAPL. Comparisons before 
and  after  the  introduction  of  professionalism  were  only  possible  in  the  case  of 
England but the results indicate that dynamic competitive balance was significantly 
higher  in  the  professional  era.  Similarly  the  results  suggest  that  the  English 
Premiership,  which  operates  revenue  sharing  and  a  salary  cap,  displays  a  greater 
degree of dynamic competitive balance than the Top 14. Our results also suggest that 
short-run competitive balance, i.e. uncertainty of outcome of individual matches, has 
improved in all three European rugby leagues, in contrast to the FAPL and English 
rugby during the amateur era. The latter results must be treated with some degree of 
caution as they were not statistically significant in most cases. 
 
Comparing performances of teams from the different leagues in the ERC suggests that 
English teams have a marginally better record than their French counterparts, despite 
the fact that the latter were not subject to revenue sharing or salary cap arrangements. 
The establishment of a joint league by the three smaller countries, which individually 
have an insufficient fan base to support a professional league, appears to have resulted 29 
 
in  a  higher  degree  of  competitive  balance  in  the  ERC  than  in  soccer’s  UEFA 
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